University of Connecticut

OpenCommons@UConn
Honors Scholar Theses

Honors Scholar Program

Spring 5-1-2013

Foreign Investment and Equity Valuation
Differences in Emerging Markets
Daniel N. Beardsley
University of Connecticut - Storrs, daniel.n.beardsley@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/srhonors_theses
Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons
Recommended Citation
Beardsley, Daniel N., "Foreign Investment and Equity Valuation Differences in Emerging Markets" (2013). Honors Scholar Theses. 311.
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/srhonors_theses/311

Foreign Investment and Equity Valuation Differences
in Emerging Markets
Dan Beardsley
Spring 2013
Honors Thesis

Advisor: Dr. James Sfiridis

daniel.n.beardsley@gmail.com

2
Introduction and Overview
What is an Emerging Market?
As defined by most economists, an emerging market is a region that demonstrates (and is
expected to continue to experience) extraordinary GDP and infrastructural growth. These
countries are “emerging” in the sense that their economies are rapidly growing and shifting from
“developing” to “developed” status. By definition, emerging market economies are characterized
by relatively low per-capita GDP. Additionally, governments of emerging market countries often
enact economic reforms that are specifically designed to spur growth and facilitate the transition
from “developing economy” to “developed economy.” 1 According to its “World Economic
Outlook Update” published in July 2012, the International Monetary Fund considers twenty-four
countries to be emerging markets: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Estonia, Hungary,
India, Indonesia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Romania, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, and Venezuela.2 For the sake of
comparison, consider the following sample from the list of twenty-six developed countries
published by Standard and Poor’s in May 2012: Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Germany,
Japan, Luxembourg, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United
States of America.3

What Risks are Associated with Emerging Markets?
Naturally, each emerging market country also carries a high risk profile relative to its
“developed market” counterparts. These risks include an increased risk of capital controls being
1

Noeth, Bryan, and Rajdeep Sengupta. "Emerging Markets: A Source of and Destination for Capital." Regional Economist (2012): 1011. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Web. 26 Mar. 2013. <http://www.stlouisfed.org/ publications/re/articles/?id=2194>.
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"New Setbacks, Further Policy Action Needed." World Economic Outlook Update 16 July 2012: n. pag. International Monetary Fund. Web. 26
Mar. 2013. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/update/02/pdf/0712.pdf>.
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"Equity Indices." S&P Global BMI 31 May 2012: n. pag. Standard & Poor's. Web. 26 Mar. 2013. <https://www.spindexdata.com/idpfiles/citigroup/prc/active/ factsheets/fs-sp-global-bmi-ltr.pdf>.
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implemented (due to the fact that emerging economies use relatively less-stable currencies),
political risk (due to heightened political instability), risk of nationalization, risk of
expropriation, legal differences (for example, laws in many emerging market countries differ
from those in developed market countries, specifically the United States, regarding firms’
misallocation of funds, inappropriate distribution of resources to insiders, etc.), and differences
in investors’ ability to effectively monitor the activities of managers. Certain industries in
emerging markets are significantly more exposed to these heightened risks, including the
transportation, communication, and public utilities industries (i.e. industries focused primarily on
serving the domestic market). In the words of Campbell R. Harvey (Duke University and the
National Bureau of Economic Research), “in contrast to decisions made in efﬁcient and
integrated capital markets, capital raising in emerging economies must address issues as
fundamental as property rights and as subtle as the differences in information available to
domestic and foreign investors.”4

Why Invest in Emerging Markets?
Due to this increased risk profile, investment opportunities in emerging markets generally
offer the potential for outsized returns. This is also logical from a macro perspective when one
considers the extraordinarily high growth rates associated with these countries. For example,
emerging markets’ collective global output increased by approximately 7% year-over-year in
2010 (growth figures for individual countries: Brazil 7.5%, Russia 4.3%, India 8.4%, China
10.4%).5 When compared with mature economies’ meager 2.6% collective increase (USA 2.4%,
Euro area 2%), it becomes clear why investors find the growth potential of emerging markets to
4

Harvey, Campbell R., Marc L. Lipson, and Francis E. Warnock. "Capital Raising in Emerging Economies." Journal of Financial
Economics (2008): 425-29. Print.
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Suttle, Philip, et al. Capital Flows to Emerging Market Economies. N.p.: Institute of International Finance, 2012. Print.

4
be attractive. Increasing capital outflows to emerging markets suggest that investors believe
developed markets are becoming increasingly saturated. For those investors who view
investment opportunities in developed markets as limited, emerging markets provide an
opportunity to earn high returns. While the quality of investment opportunities and level of risk
associated with each aforementioned “emerging market” country vary drastically across
countries, most economic professionals agree that certain emerging markets offer significantly
better investment prospects than others. As was stated previously, this paper will focus on four of
these “elite” emerging markets: Brazil, Russia, India, and China (also known as the BRIC
countries).

Methods for Investing in Emerging Markets
There are two ways in which foreign market participants (for example, investors in the
United States) can invest in emerging markets: foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign
portfolio investment (FPI). FDI is a large-scale investment that requires the investor to obtain
some sort of ownership or controlling stake in the target area. For example, this could include an
investment in a factory or land in an emerging market. As a general rule, the investor must take a
minimum of a 10% ownership stake in the target entity for the investment to be considered FDI.
Since FDI generally establishes a direct connection between the investor and factors of
production in the target area, these investments tend to be less volatile than FPI (this direct
connection minimizes communication breakdowns between foreign owners and local managers).
However, like any investment in emerging markets, FDI still carries a tremendous amount of risk
(for example, broken contracts with foreign-owned entities in the Argentinian utilities industry in
the early 2000s). FDI inflows to emerging markets have increased significantly and relatively
steadily since the 1990s. As a result, FDI has become the largest component of emerging
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markets’ net capital inflows.6 However, FDI valuation methods are rather esoteric and are often
conducted on an ad-hoc basis. Since there is no existing market for most FDI investments, there
can be no continuous market-determined valuations. As a result, the valuation of FDI
investments will not be a focal point of this paper.
FPI is an investment that is made without obtaining a controlling stake in the target firm.
As opposed to FDI, FPI investments are generally made for the sole purpose of earning a return.
An example of FPI would be purchasing a foreign firm’s bonds or shares of its equity.7 There are
numerous advantages of choosing FPI over FDI. First, FPI generally requires significantly less
capital. Second, FPI allows investors to obtain a claim on the firm’s assets without being
required to get involved with its daily operations. Third, FPI investments are often considerably
more liquid than FDI investments (equity and bond markets are strictly regulated and are open to
virtually all investors, including retail investors; sales of FDI investments are not regulated and
only draw interest from large companies in the same industry). Like FDI, FPI investments in
emerging markets still carry a tremendous amount of risk. As Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta,
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer point out in their article “The Law and
Economics of Self-Dealing,” legal protections for shareholders (especially minority
shareholders) vary drastically between developed and emerging markets. Even more, these legal
protections can be vastly different across different emerging markets.8 The valuation of FPI,
specifically equity investments (measured by price/earnings ratio, which provides a measure of
the amount of money investors are willing to pay for $1 of a firm’s earnings), in firms based in
emerging markets will be the primary focus of this paper.
6

Green, Stephen, et al. Foreign Direct Investment in Emerging Market Countries. N.p.: HSBC Holdings plc, 2003. Print.
Noeth, Bryan, and Rajdeep Sengupta. "Emerging Markets: A Source of and Destination for Capital." Regional Economist (2012). Federal
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Recent Investment Trends in Emerging Markets
According to data from the World Bank, FDI inflows to emerging markets accounted for
approximately 20% of annual global FDI inflows from 1992-1997. This share plummeted to
below 10% of global FDI flows following the onset of the East Asia/Russian Federation financial
crisis in 1998. Investors began to regain faith in emerging markets around 2000; since then, this
share has been rising relatively steadily and, as of 2010, FDI inflows to emerging markets
accounted for nearly 23% of global FDI inflows.6 According to the Institute of International
Finance (IIF), most post-2008 foreign investment in emerging markets has been directed toward
Asian markets (Latin American markets are a distant second). China remains the dominant
player: in 2011, 75% of all capital inflows to emerging markets in Asia went to China. The IIF
also suggests that most inflows to emerging markets in recent years have come in the form of
equity investments rather than debt. Of the corporate bonds that are issued by firms based in
emerging markets, nearly two-thirds are issued by firms based in Asia.9
As was mentioned previously, investors considering opportunities in emerging markets
must account for various types of risk. One source of risk that is particularly relevant for
emerging markets is political risk: the risk of government instability or political changes
affecting the return of an investment. According to Mihir A. Desai (Harvard University and the
National Bureau of Economic Research), C. Fritz Foley (Harvard University and the NBER), and
James R. Hines Jr.’s (University of Michigan and NBER) paper “Capital Structure with Risky
Foreign Investment,” multinational corporations account for political risk exposure by adjusting
their use of leverage. The authors suggest that for every one standard deviation increase in
exposure to political risk, multinational corporations reduce their leverage by approximately
9

Suttle, Philip, et al. Capital Flows to Emerging Market Economies. N.p.: Institute of International Finance, 2012. Print.
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3.5%.10 Seeing that debt is typically a firm’s cheapest source of capital, this risk-management
measure naturally causes the multinational corporation’s overall cost of capital to increase.
Another method of hedging against political risk exposure would be to purchase political risk
insurance to protect the firm from downside risk associated with political turmoil. This product is
offered by a number of different insurers, including the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC). According to OPIC, political risk insurance “allows U.S. businesses to take advantage of
commercially attractive opportunities in emerging markets, mitigating risk and helping them
compete in a global marketplace.”11 The firm goes on to state that “OPIC insurance provides
innovative, comprehensive, and cost-effective risk-mitigation products to cover losses to tangible
assets, investment value, and earnings that result from political perils.” In other words, political
risk insurance can be used to hedge against losses that directly result from politically-driven
events in emerging markets, such as the nationalization of privately-owned assets.

The BRIC Countries
In terms of countries making the transition from “developing market” to “developed
market,” the BRIC countries are generally accepted to be among the world leaders. According to
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Brazil, Russia, India, China, Indonesia, and South Korea
are expected to account for nearly 45% of global output by 2025.12 According to the United
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, these same six countries have a combined
population that makes up approximately 52% of the world’s current population.10
As a result of these tremendous growth prospects, the four BRIC countries are among the
most common targets of capital flows (both FDI and FPI) from foreign investors. According to
10
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12
Noeth, Bryan, and Rajdeep Sengupta. "Emerging Markets: A Source of and Destination for Capital." Regional Economist (2012). Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Web. 26 Mar. 2013. <http://www.stlouisfed.org/ publications/re/articles/?id=2194>.
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Malvina Pollock and Ibrahim Levent (both of the World Bank’s Development Data Group), the
BRIC countries have received nearly half of all net capital inflows to developing markets since
2005. In 2010, developing markets received approximately $1.13 trillion of net capital flows; of
these inflows, BRIC countries received nearly 60%. Data also suggest that the BRIC countries
have been faster to regain investor confidence than other developing markets following the 20082009 global financial crisis: net equity inflows to BRIC countries increased by over 34% from
2009 to 2010, which is significantly greater than the 11% gain experienced by other developing
markets. Similarly, net debt inflows to BRIC countries increased by a factor of 2.5 from 2009 to
2010, while other developing countries only saw net debt inflows increase by a factor of 1.5.
Among the BRIC countries, China consistently receives the largest share of net capital inflows.
From 2005-2010, China received approximately half of total net capital inflows to BRIC
countries, with the other half being distributed evenly among Brazil, Russia, and India.13 The
following figures (Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3) provide an effective visual display of trends
related to post-1990 net capital flows into BRIC countries.14

13

Pollock, Malvina, and Ibrahim Levent. "Capital Flows to Developing Countries - BRIC: Where the Action Is." The World Bank. World Bank
Group, 19 Dec. 2011. Web. 26 Mar. 2013. <http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/capital-flows-to-developing-countries-bric-where-theaction-is>.
14
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Figure 1
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Figure 1 provides a look at total FDI and
FPI flows to BRIC countries from 1990-2011. Total
FDI flows increased steadily from 1990-2008, then
crashed during the 2009 global economic crisis.
However, they quickly recovered, eclipsing pre-crisis
peak levels.
FPI inflows increased steadily from 19902007, then crashed during the onset of the financial
crisis in 2008. They recovered in 2009-2010, but
crashed again in 2011 as investors pulled money
from equities.

Figure 2

FDI Flows by Country
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Figure 2 shows annual FDI inflows to each
BRIC country. As is shown in the figure, China
dominated FDI inflows for virtually the entire time
period. Brazil was a major target from 1997-2003,
but soon lost its advantage over India and Russia.
Neither India nor Russia was a major FDI target until
2004, when both countries began to steadily increase
their FDI inflows each year.
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Figure 3

FPI Flows by Country
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Figure 3 shows annual FPI inflows to each
BRIC country. The data clearly shows that FPI
inflows are significantly smaller than FDI inflows,
which makes sense given that FDI flows represent
enormous investments by institutions seeking
ownership stakes.
FPI flows are also more volatile. Net FPI
inflows follow the same general pattern for each
country: slow growth from 1990-2004, significant
growth until crashing in 2007, then recovering to precrisis levels before crashing again in 2011 (except
Russia, which crashed in both 2010 and 2011).
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The Capital Raising Process for Large Firms in Emerging Markets
When emerging market-based firms reach a certain size, it becomes necessary for them to
utilize major securities exchanges (located in developed markets) in order to raise sufficient
capital. These foreign exchanges in developed markets provide a number of significant
advantages to large firms over smaller local exchanges. First, they allow large firms to access a
significantly more expansive investor base, both in terms of the number of potential investors
and their collective buying power. Additionally, listing a firm’s securities on a major exchange
significantly improves the liquidity of these securities (which can be partially attributed to the
larger investor base; other factors include increased trading volume, etc.). Stijn Claessans
(International Monetary Fund and the University of Amsterdam, Netherlands) and Sergio L.
Schmukler (World Bank) argue in their 2007 paper “International Financial Integration through
Equity Markets” that a firm based in an emerging market can actually reduce its cost of equity,
and therefore its overall cost of capital, by listing its equity on a major foreign exchange. 15 There
are significant barriers to entry that a firm must pass in order for its equity to qualify for most
major exchanges. These barriers often include, but are not limited to, a minimum market capital
capitalization, significant monetary costs (listing fees, etc.) associated with listing securities on a
major exchange, costs related to compliance with international accounting standards, and a
mandatory commitment to a considerably high standard of disclosure (relative to the amount of
disclosure required by exchanges in most emerging markets). Claessans and Schmukler argue
that a firm’s ability to overcome these barriers to entry makes its equity appear less risky to
investors. As a direct result, investors’ required return on the equity falls and the firm’s cost of
equity decreases.
15

Claessens, Stijn, and Sergio L. Schmukler. "International Financial Integration through Equity Markets." Journal of International Money and
Finance (2007): 788-813. ScienceDirect. Web. 26 Mar. 2013.
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While a select few emerging market-based firms do actually have physical shares listed
on major exchanges in developed markets, the most common financial instruments used by firms
seeking access to major exchanges are depositary receipts. These securities are relatively
straightforward: the firm first hires a global financial institution (ex: JPMorgan Chase, Deutsche
Bank, Citigroup, Barclays, etc.) that has a presence in both the domestic emerging market and
foreign developed market (the market in which the desired exchange is located). The financial
institution thoroughly researches the firm and analyzes its financials to ensure that the firm
passes each of the aforementioned “barriers to entry.” If the firm passes these criteria, it then
sells its shares to the financial institution. The bank securitizes these shares into depositary
receipts, with each depositary receipt representing a specific number of physical equity shares (a
ratio of 1:1 means that each depositary receipt represents one share of the firm’s equity, 1:5
means that each depositary receipt represents five shares of equity, 5:1 means that a bundle of
five depositary receipts represents one share of equity, etc.). The bank then sells these depositary
receipts to investors on the firm’s desired major exchange (depositary receipts traded on a United
States-based exchange are called American Depositary Receipts [ADRs], etc.).
According to the Bank of New York Mellon’s Depositary Receipt Directory, there were
525 separate instances from 2000-2012 in which BRIC-based firms used depositary receipts to
issue shares of their equity on major exchanges. Of these 525 issuances, sixty-five were
conducted by firms based in Brazil (12.38%), sixty-eight by firms based in Russia (12.95%), 226
by firms based in India (43.05%), and 166 by firms based in China (31.62%). The most common
major exchanges used to issue these depositary receipts included the New York Stock Exchange,
NASDAQ Stock Market, London Stock Exchange, Singapore Exchange, and Luxembourg Stock
Exchange. The amount of money raised by each of these depositary receipt issuances varied
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widely; the largest single capital-raising effort was conducted by Neftynaya Companiya-Rosneft
(a Russian producer of oil and gas), which raised nearly $6.4 billion in July 2006, while the
smallest single issuance raised only $750,649 for Ping An Insurance Company of China (a
Chinese life insurance provider) in 2003.16

Equity Valuations for Firms Based in BRIC Countries
Based on the information given above, it is clear that BRIC-based firms with equity
traded on major exchanges are fundamentally identical to the strongest firms based in developed
markets. Firms in each group are large (in terms of market capitalization), have strong financials
and business prospects (for BRIC-based firms, this is certified by a respected global financial
institution), comply with high standards of disclosure to investors, and adhere to strict
international accounting standards. This raises the following question: despite these clear
similarities, does increased country-specific risk influence the market to value the equity of firms
based in BRIC countries more conservatively than it values the equity of firms based in
advanced economies?
As was discussed previously, emerging markets (including the BRIC countries) generally
carry heightened risk profiles compared to their developed market counterparts. This additional
risk can be broken into several categories, including political risk, socioeconomic risk, and
uncertainty surrounding each market’s prospects for future growth. When market participants
invest in emerging markets, they naturally inherit this country-related risk. As a result, I
hypothesize that investors (i.e. the market) directly account for this risk by using more
conservative valuations (measured by price/earnings ratio) for the equity of BRIC-based firms
than they use for the equity of similar firms located in developed markets. In other words, I
16

"DR Directory." BNY Mellon Depositary Receipts. BNY Mellon, 2013. Web. 26 Mar. 2013. <http://www.adrbnymellon.com/dr_directory.jsp>.
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expect P/E ratios to vary significantly between emerging and developed markets. I also expect
P/E ratios to vary significantly across different emerging markets, with equity valuations in each
country being heavily dependent on the risk profile of that specific market. I chose to focus on
P/E ratios because, as was mentioned previously, this statistic provides a measure of how much
money (all data used in this paper is converted to U.S. dollars) investors are willing to pay for $1
of a firm’s earnings. A P/E ratio, thus, provides an approximation of the value assigned by
investors to a firm’s earnings.

Testing the Hypothesis: Do P/E Ratios Vary Significantly Across Countries?
Simple Comparison
To test this hypothesis, I first compared valuations (P/E ratios) of some of the largest
BRIC-based firms with valuations of their peer firms in developed countries. I selected the eight
firms with the largest depositary receipt capital raisings of the past decade (using the BNY
Mellon Depositary Receipt database): Neftynaya Companiya-Rosneft (Oil & Gas Producers,
Russia), Petroleo Brasileiro-Petrobas (Oil & Gas Producers, Brazil), VTB Bank (Banks, Russia),
Banco Santander Brasil (Banks, Brazil), Sberbank of Russia (Banks, Russia), ICICI Bank
(Banks, India), Vale (Industrial Metals & Mining, Brazil), and China Unicom (Mobile Telecom,
China). This group includes firms located in each BRIC country and covers four different
industries, making it an acceptable introductory sample.
Next, I used Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes to establish a list of ten United
States-based peer companies for each firm. For each firm, I selected the ten U.S.-based peer
companies with the most comparable market capitalizations (to minimize any influence that a
firm’s size might have on its P/E ratio). I then compared the P/E ratio of each BRIC-based firm
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with the median P/E ratio of its U.S.-based peers. For this comparison, I used three P/E ratios:
TTM (trailing twelve months), FY1 (expected P/E ratio for fiscal year 1), and FY2 (expected for
fiscal year 2).
The results of this comparison confirmed my suspicions that BRIC-based firms are
generally valued more conservatively than their U.S.-based peers. Of the eight original firms,
seven provided usable data (Brazil-based Vale only had four peer companies in the United
States). Of those seven firms, five had P/E ratios (TTM, FY1, and FY2) noticeably lower than
the median P/E ratio of their peer companies. The two exceptions were ICICI Bank and China
Unicom. For reference, the data for Neftynaya Companiya-Rosneft and its peer firms in the
United States are presented in Figure 4.17
Figure 4
Market Data & Price Multiples (SIC Code: 1311; Currency: USD)
Name
Neftynaya Companiya-Rosneft

Price

Market Cap

TTM

FY1

FY2

8.36

88,641.91

7.06

8.52

8.89

77.30

32,599.84

12.37

8.38

7.30

115.92

226,876.40

8.70

9.50

9.46

CONOCOPHILLIPS

58.60

71,134.19

8.71

10.64

9.50

EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION

89.32

402,118.60

9.21

11.33

10.99

HESS CORPORATION

68.21

23,296.92

10.47

10.89

10.77

MARATHON OIL CORPORATION

35.71

25,261.85

13.95

11.99

11.17

MURPHY OIL CORPORATION

61.99

12,047.00

12.43

11.98

9.64

OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION

85.80

69,513.69

15.13

11.72

10.95

ONEOK, INC.

47.95

9,811.19

28.89

29.44

24.73

PHILLIPS 66

64.76

40,527.21

9.99

8.66

9.36

-

-

10.47

10.89

9.64

APACHE CORPORATION
CHEVRON CORPORATION

Median

These results clearly indicate that the equity of BRIC-based firms is valued more
conservatively (i.e. using lower multiples) than that of their developed-market counterparts.
However, it does not provide a specific reason for this discrepancy (i.e. specific risk factors that
influence P/E ratio). Additionally, it does not indicate whether or not these discrepancies are
statistically significant.
17

Data provided by ThomsonOne Banker; data for the other six firms is available upon request
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Specific Influential Risk Factors
Which specific country-related risk factors have the greatest impact on equity valuations?
To begin, I compiled a database of companies from each BRIC country that have equity listed on
the New York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ Stock Market, or London Stock Exchange (either in
the form of physical shares or sponsored depositary receipts).18 After removing companies with
negligible or nonexistent P/E ratios (this occurs when the firm’s earnings are either negative or
minimal), I was left with a database of 249 BRIC-based firms: forty-two from Brazil, fifty-three
from Russia, seventy-seven from India, and seventy-seven from China. A median P/E ratio for
each country was then determined.19 I also calculated a median P/E ratio for the United States
using the same methodology and an index of 148 large-cap stocks. The resulting median P/E
multiples were as follows:
Country
United States
Brazil
Russia
India
China

Median P/E Ratio
16.23
14.10
8.60
9.10
14.80

Based on this information, investors value equities based in each BRIC country more
conservatively than they value U.S.-based equities. They value the equity of Chinese companies
the least conservatively of the BRIC-based firms, followed by Brazil, India, and Russia,
respectively. Based on the assumption that P/E ratios are negatively associated with country risk
(in other words, countries with less risk have higher P/E ratios), this suggests that investors view
China as being the least-risky BRIC country, followed by Brazil, India, and Russia, respectively.

18

Information gathered from the BNY Mellon DR database as well as each of the listed exchanges; full data set is available upon request
This was calculated using ThomsonOne Banker to find each firm’s P/E ratio; I chose to use each firm’s trailing-twelve-months (TTM) P/E
ratio as of December 31, 2012 for the sake of consistency.
19
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Next, I obtained country risk data from the PRS Group, a firm that specializes in political
risk analysis. The PRS Group calculates an aggregate political risk rating for every country by
rating each country according to twelve categories of risk. The country’s aggregate risk rating is
the sum of its scores for each category. Each category has a different maximum score; a low
score in a certain category indicates a high level of risk. As a result, a low aggregate score is
associated with a high level of overall political risk (the maximum aggregate score is 100 points).
The twelve categories are: government stability (maximum score of twelve), socioeconomic
conditions (twelve), investment profile (twelve), internal conflict (twelve), external conflict
(twelve), corruption (six), military in politics (six), religious tensions (six), law and order (six),
ethnic tensions (six), democratic accountability (six), and bureaucracy quality (four).20
I then calculated a series of correlation coefficients, finding the correlation between P/E
ratio and aggregate risk rating as well as correlations between P/E ratio and each of the twelve
risk categories. For my original sample, I used each of the five median P/E ratios calculated
above (USA and BRICs). The strongest individual correlations, as well as the overall correlation,
are shown below in Figure 5:
Figure 5

Country
Brazil
China
India
Russia
USA
CORREL

Socioecon.
Conditions

Internal
Conflict

Overall
Risk

7.0
8.0
4.5
5.5
8.5
0.954335

9.5
9.0
6.0
7.5
10.0
0.911992

69.0
62.5
58.5
62.0
81.5
0.752786

P/E
Ratio
14.1
14.8
9.1
8.6
16.2

“Socioeconomic conditions risk” and “internal conflict risk” produced the strongest
correlation coefficients (against P/E ratio) of any individual risk factor. These correlation

20

For a more detailed explanation of the PRS Group’s rating methodology, visit http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx
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coefficients, .95 and .91 respectively, indicate an incredibly strong positive association between a
country’s risk rating in these two categories and its median P/E ratio. In other words, less risk in
these categories is associated with a higher median P/E ratio. The correlation coefficient between
aggregate risk rating and P/E ratio was 0.75, which also indicates a strong positive relationship (a
higher aggregate risk rating indicates lower country risk, so low country risk is associated with a
high median P/E ratio).
To see if these strong associations held with a larger sample, I added twelve more
countries to the sample, using the TTM P/E ratio of a prominent equity index in each country as
the country’s median P/E value (ex: the P/E ratio used for Germany was that of the DAX index).
Though the associations weakened, similar patterns emerged. The strongest individual
correlations, as well as the overall correlation, are shown below in Figure 6:
Figure 6

Country
Australia
Brazil
Canada
China
Denmark
France
Germany
India
Netherlands

Socioecon.
Conditions

Internal
Conflict

Overall
Risk

P/E
Ratio

10.0
7.0
9.0
8.0
10.0
8.5
9.0
4.5
10.0

10.0
9.5
11.0
9.0
9.0
10.0
10.0
6.0
10.5

84.5
69.0
86.5
62.5
84.5
77.5
82.5
58.5
86.0

20.6
14.1
15.7
14.8
21.5
14.5
14.8
9.1
12.4

Country
(continuation)

Socioecon.
Conditions

Internal
Conflict

Overall
Risk

New Zealand
Norway
Russia
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
U.K.
United States
CORREL

8.5
10.5
5.5
9.0
9.5
10.0
8.5
8.5
0.680449

11.5
11.0
7.5
10.5
12.0
11.0
8.5
10.0
0.626689

87.5
88.5
62.0
87.0
86.0
80.0
81.0
81.5
0.595328

Even with a larger sample size, “socioeconomic conditions risk” and “internal conflict
risk” still produced the strongest correlation coefficients against P/E ratio. Though the
correlation coefficients decreased to 0.68 and 0.63, respectively, these coefficients still suggest
that there is a strong positive association between each of these risk factors and P/E ratio (a
higher risk rating indicates lower risk, so low risk in each of these categories is associated with a
higher P/E ratio). Likewise, the “overall risk” correlation coefficient of 0.60 indicates a strong

P/E
Ratio
20.4
13.6
8.6
15.0
20.0
21.7
14.6
16.0
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positive association between a country’s aggregate risk rating and its median P/E ratio. Though
this data clearly shows that there is a strong association between a country’s risk rating and its
P/E ratio, it does not tell us whether or not these differences in P/E ratios across countries are
statistically significant. In other words, thus far we cannot say with certainty if these
discrepancies can be attributed to country risk.

Testing for Statistical Significance: U.S Firms vs. BRIC Firms
Though the above information clearly suggests that there is a strong association between
country risk and price/earnings ratio, are differences in median P/E ratios across countries
statistically significant?
To test for significance, I performed two ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. First, I
wanted to test if the apparent discrepancy between the price/earnings multiples of developed
market-based firms and emerging market-based firms was statistically significant. To do this, I
performed a regression using one dummy “x” variable: each BRIC-based firm was assigned a
value of “1” (x1 = 1) and each U.S.-based firm was assigned a value of “0” (x1 = 0). The
resulting regression would then produce the following equation:
Model: Y = α + βX where (Y = P/E ratio) and (X = 0 if U.S.-based, 1 if BRIC-based)

However, the data first had to be transformed. One of the assumptions of an OLS
regression is that the response variable sample be normally distributed. Looking at the
aforementioned database of 249 P/E ratios for BRIC-based firms and 148 P/E ratios for United
States-based firms, it is clear that this data set does not even remotely resemble a normal
distribution (see Figure 7 for the visual representation, which displays extreme right skew and
“fat tails,” i.e. leptokurtosis.):
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Figure 7

Distribution of Original Data
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Mean
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19.723

150

St. Dev.

28.534

100

Skew
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Kurtosis

43.78

50
0.10
15.92
31.74
47.56
63.38
79.21
95.03
110.85
126.67
142.49
158.31
174.13
189.95
205.77
221.59
237.42
253.24
269.06
284.88

0

P/E Ratio

As a result, the original data had to be transformed in order to satisfy the “normal
distribution” condition. To do this, I simply took the natural logarithm (ln) of each price/earnings
ratio in the data set. This approach worked well, producing an improved data set more closely
approximating normality (see Figure 8):
Figure 8

Distribution using ln(P/E Ratio)
120
100

Mean

2.575

80

St. Dev.

0.892

Skew

-0.633

Kurtosis

4.535

60
40
20
5.28

4.86

4.44

4.02

3.60

3.18

2.76

2.33

1.91

1.49

1.07

0.65

0.23

-0.20

-0.62

-1.04

-1.46

-1.88

-2.30

0

ln(P/E Ratio)

Once the response data was approximately normally distributed, I could move forward
with the first OLS regression.21 This regression produced the following results (Figure 9):

21

I assumed that all other OLS conditions, such as independence of the explanatory variables, were satisfied.
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Figure 9

These results provide a tremendous amount of information. First, under the Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA) output, we see that our calculated F-value (16.70) is greater than our critical F-value
(3.87; this value can be found on an F-distribution table using: significance level α = 0.05,
numerator degrees of freedom = 1, and denominator degrees of freedom = 395). This tells us to
reject the null hypothesis (H0: μus = μbric), which states that the coefficient to the BRIC dummy
variable should be equal to zero (in other words, the null hypothesis states that Y will be the
same for both USA-based and BRIC-based countries). Instead, the data suggests that the
alternative hypothesis (HA: μus ≠ μbric; the Y-value should be different for USA-based and BRICbased firms) is likely true. Second, we see that the P-value of the BRIC coefficient is
approximately 0.000053. This essentially tells us that if the null hypothesis were true, the
probability of observing a data set at least as extreme as this one would be approximately
0.0053%. Since this probability falls below our predetermined significance level of 5% (α =
0.05), it provides further confirmation that we should reject the null hypothesis. Finally, we can
examine the R-Square value of 0.0406 and the 95% confidence interval. The R2 value tells us
that approximately 4.06% of the variation in the Y variable (lnP/E) can be explained by variation
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in the X variable (i.e. whether or not the firm is based in a BRIC country). While there is still a
lot of P/E variation that is not explained by the company location, this figure suggests that “U.S.
vs. BRIC location” plays a relatively significant role in determining a firm’s P/E ratio. The 95%
confidence interval tells us that we can expect, with 95% confidence, the X variable (BRIC)
coefficient to fall somewhere between -0.549 and -0.193. In conclusion, this regression output
tells us that the difference between the average P/E ratio for a US-based firm and that of a BRICbased firm is statistically significant. As a result, we can use the equation provided by the
regression: Y = 2.807 – 0.371(BRIC), where Y is equal to the natural logarithm of a firm’s
price/earnings ratio. This equation is represented visually in Figure 10.

Figure 10

Regression Results: USA vs. BRIC
2.9
2.8
2.7
ln(P/E)

Intercept = 2.807 = USA

BRIC

2.6
2.5

Y = 2.807204756 - 0.371005608 (BRIC)

2.4
2.3
2.2

Testing for Statistical Significance: U.S vs. Brazil vs. Russia vs. China vs. India-based Firms
The previous OLS regression was helpful in that it informed us that equity valuation (P/E
ratio) discrepancies between U.S. and BRIC-based firms were statistically significant (i.e.
whether a firm is US-based or BRIC-based can influence the market’s valuation of its equity in a
statistically significant way). However, it is lacking in the sense that it does not allow us to
analyze the statistical significance of valuation differences across individual countries. In other
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words, do equity valuations vary significantly in the United States, Brazil, Russia, India, and
China due to each country’s unique risk profile?
I performed a second OLS regression to examine this question further. The data set used
in this regression was identical to the data set used in the previous regression: the natural
logarithm of P/E multiples for 148 U.S., 42 Brazil, 53 Russia, 77 India, and 77 China-based
firms. As opposed to the previous regression, in which I used only one independent dummy
variable (x1 = 1  BRIC, x1 = 0  USA), I used four independent dummy variables for this
regression: x1 (Brazil), x2 (Russia), x3 (India), and x4 (China) (U.S.-based firms were assigned a
value of 0 for each of the four dummy variables; this will allow the U.S. to serve as the baseline
in the regression output). Figure 11 shows how firms based in each respective country were
coded for the regression:
Figure 11

As was discussed previously, the data set is normally distributed. The outputs of this regression
(USA vs. Brazil vs. Russia vs. India vs. China) are summarized in Figure 12:
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Figure 12

Much like the results of the first regression, the results of the second regression provide
an abundance of useful information. First, take a look at the calculated F-value under the
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) results. This value (8.489) is greater than the critical F-value of
2.395 (the critical F-value can be found on an F-distribution table using: significance level α =
0.05, numerator degrees of freedom = 4, and denominator degrees of freedom = 392), which
suggests that we should reject the null hypothesis (H0). In this case, the null hypothesis is H0: μusa
= μbrazil = μrussia = μindia = μchina (in other words, the average ln[P/E] value should be identical
across all five countries, meaning that the coefficient for each respective BRIC country [x1, x2,
x3, and x4] should be equal to zero.). Instead, the evidence suggests that the alternative
hypothesis (HA) is correct. In this case, the alternative hypothesis is HA: μusa ≠ μbrazil ≠ μrussia ≠
μindia ≠ μchina. In other words, the coefficients for at least some of the dummy independent
variables should have non-zero values.
Next, take a look at the calculated P-value for each respective BRIC country (X variable
1 through 4). The P-value for Brazil is 0.521, which is much greater than the predetermined
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significance level of α = 0.05. This P-value tells us that, if the null hypothesis is true, we can
expect to observe Brazilian data at least this extreme approximately 52.1% of the time. This tells
us that the results for Brazil are not statistically significant. Russia’s P-value of .0000059 is
lower than the significance level. This tells us that Russia’s results are statistically significant; if
the null hypothesis were true, we would expect to observe Russian data at least this extreme only
.00059% of the time. India’s P-value of .0000084 is also lower than α = 0.05, meaning that
India’s results are also statistically significant. If the null hypothesis were true, we would expect
to observe Indian data at least this extreme only 0.00084% of the time. Finally, China’s P-value
of .1686 tells us that China’s results are not statistically significant. If the null hypothesis were
true, we would expect to observe Chinese data at least this extreme approximately 16.86% of the
time. For further confirmation, examine the 95% confidence intervals for each country. The two
countries with non-significant results, Brazil and China, each have 95% confidence intervals that
include both positive and negative coefficients. On the other hand, both Russia and India have
95% confidence intervals that only include negative coefficients.
Lastly, look at the R-square value of approximately 0.0797. This value suggests that
approximately 7.97% of variation in the Y variable (ln[P/E]) can be explained by variation in the
X variables (whether the firm is located in Brazil, Russia, India, China, or the United States).
Since the results for both Brazil and China were non-significant, we cannot use the X1
and X4 coefficients in our equation. As a result, we are left with the following equation:
Y = 2.80720 - 0.63209 (Russia) - 0.54536 (India)

This equation suggests that the natural logarithm of a U.S.-based firm’s P/E ratio should be
approximately equal to Y = 2.80720 – 0.63209(0) – 0.54536(0) = 2.80720. Similarly, the natural
logarithm of a Russian-based firm’s P/E ratio should be approximately equal to Y = 2.80720 –
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0.63209(1) – 0.54536(0) = 2.17511 and the natural logarithm of an Indian-based firm’s P/E ratio
should be approximately equal to Y = 2.80720 – 0.63209(0) – 0.54536(1) = 2.26185. These
results can be seen in Figure 13:
Figure 13

Regression Results: USA vs. Russia
vs. India
3
2.5

Intercept (USA)

2

Russia

India
Y = 2.80720 - 0.63209(Russia) - 0.54536(India)

ln(P/E) 1.5
1
0.5
0

Remember, each of these values is equal to ln(P/E). So, in theory, we should be able to
derive the expected P/E multiple for each country by exponentiating each Y value. For example,
the value of ln(P/E) for the United States is approximately 2.80720 (as given in the above
equation). If we exponentiate, i.e., raise e to the power of 2.80720, the resulting value should be
approximately equal to the regression’s projected P/E value for a firm based in the United States.
The exponentiated value is 16.56, meaning that the expected P/E ratio for a U.S.-based firm is
16.56. Performing the same operation for Russia and India results in expected P/E multiples of
8.80 and 9.60, respectively.
For the sake of comparison, let us compare the regression’s projected P/E multiples for
these three countries with the actual median values that were calculated using a database of 148
U.S.-based firms, 53 Russian-based firms, and 77 Indian-based firms (in addition to projections
and actual figures for the 42 Brazil-based firms and 77 China-based firms) (see Figure 14):
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Figure 14

Country

Median P/E Ratio
(from database)

Projected P/E Ratio
(Regression)

United States
Russia
India
Brazil
China

16.23
8.60
9.10
14.10
14.80

16.56
8.80
9.60
15.04
14.02

Amazingly, the expected P/E multiples projected by the regression equation are nearly identical
to actual median P/E ratio calculated for each country. Addtionally, we can see that Brazil and
China’s values are extremely close to those of the United States, which indicates that country
risk does not have a significant effect on the P/E ratios of firms located in these two emerging
markets.

Conclusions
It is clear that equity valuations vary significantly not only between emerging markets
and developing markets, but also across individual countries. Differences in price/earnings ratios
between the United States and two of the BRIC countries are statistically significant, as we saw
firsthand. On the other hand, while country-specific risk (particularly socioeconomic risk and
internal conflict risk) may be strongly associated with a country’s P/E multiple, this relationship
is not necessarily statistically significant. Specifically regarding the BRIC countries, we have
learned that differences in equity valuations between firms based in the United States and those
based in either Russia or India are statistically significant (and can therefore be at least partially
attributed to country risk with a strong level of confidence). On the other hand, the same cannot
be said for differences in P/E multiples between U.S.-based firms and companies based in either
Brazil or China.
However, the low R2 values (0.0406 and 0.0797) discussed previously indicate that while
country risk can certainly have a significant effect on the P/E ratios of firms based in BRIC
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countries (particularly Russia and India), there is still a tremendous amount of P/E ratio variation
that remains unexplained. Explaining such variation could be the basis for further research.
Additionally, why does country risk only have a statistically significant effect on equity
valuations for firms based in Russia and India? Based on research and prior knowledge, it seems
as though China and Russia are generally viewed as being “risky,” while Brazil and India are
typically viewed as “less risky.” As a result, before reviewing the data, I expected the effect of
country risk to be insignificant for both Brazil and India, but significant for China and Russia as
it relates to “investment” risk. However, my research clearly indicates that this is not the case.
The explanatory factors behind this stark discrepancy between general perception and investment
reality could also be the basis for future research.
Overall, it is clear that emerging markets, particularly Brazil, Russia, India, and China,
are playing an increasingly important role in the global economy. These markets are quickly
growing both financially and in terms of population and are expected to become leading
economic players over the coming decades. As this transition occurs and each BRIC country’s
risk profile changes accordingly, we can expect to see these equity valuation trends adjust
accordingly.
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